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Politics drugs and the gun

Whether or not peace talks collapse, right-wing paramilitaries, such as those pictured above, now ha
mar 20 septiembre 2011 02:55 PM

IN MARCH, Iván Roberto Duque, a chieftain of Colombia's right-wing paramilitary vigilantes, accused Óscar Trujillo, the mayor of the small town of Aguadas, of killing a congressman. Mr Trujillo promptly fled to an army base--with some reason. Facing death threats, the congressman had sought the protection of the fearsome Mr Duque, whose nom de guerre is Ernesto Báez. "I myself would carry out justice, but we are in a peace process," Mr Báez thundered, seeming livid that his authority had been challenged. That does not often happen in Caldas, a coffee-growing department where Mr Báez heads the local paramilitary army.

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The mayor's plight underlines just how powerful the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), as the paramilitaries call themselves, have become as both a military and political force. Since 2003, the AUC has been talking peace with President Álvaro Uribe's government. Some 4,000 paramilitary troops have demobilised as a result. Yet far from being defeated, all the signs are that the AUC is stronger than ever. That is worrying, since the AUC is deeply involved in drug-trafficking and kills more civilians than its foes, the left-wing guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

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The AUC's origins lie in vigilante groups set up by landowners for protection against the guerrillas. Two decades ago, drug-traffickers began buying land and transformed the vigilantes into private armies. Some military officers--but not the army as an institution--collude with the paramilitaries.

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The AUC'S involvement in the drug trade is a sticking point in the peace talks. Mr Báez, who has emerged as the organisation's senior figure, has threatened to break off the talks if the amnesty bill does not prohibit the extradition of paramilitary leaders facing drug charges in the United States. Another disagreement concerns treatment of past crimes. A bill wending its way through Congress would prescribe up to eight years of confinement for those guilty of crimes against humanity. Critics say the bill would not, in practice, dismantle the criminal networks.

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The paramilitaries are too strong to be forced to accept a settlement they dislike. Alfredo Rangel, a security analyst, reckons the AUC still has more than 10,000 troops, plus civilian helpers. It operates in a third of Colombia's municipalities. Despite a supposed ceasefire, some AUC leaders continue to recruit. Drug money allows them to pay unemployed youths up to 500,000 pesos ($210) a month.

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More novel is the AUC's growing political power. This is hard to quantify. But last year Salvatore Mancuso, a now-demobilised AUC military chief, claimed to control 30% of the Congress. In several regions, AUC chiefs pick candidates for mayor, town council and governor. They decide who will get municipal contracts.

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The AUC's influence is especially pervasive along the drug-exporting Caribbean coast. In Magdalena and César, suspiciously, only one candidate stood for governor at last year's local elections. "We control most of the north coast, the Magdalena Medio in the centre of the country, and in the south, Nariño and Putumayo," brags "Jorge 40", a warlord who commands the AUC's northern block. The mayors of two departmental capitals, Cúcuta and Riohacha, were arrested last year for alleged ties to paramilitaries. The chief prosecutor in Cúcuta is on the run, after claims that she was an AUC collaborator.

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As for the organisation's political agenda, it is straightforward: security for Colombians and amnesty for itself. Mr Mancuso told Semana, a news magazine, that he aspired to political office and that political rights were a greater concern to the AUC than avoiding punishment. Earlier this month, Congress amended the amnesty bill to deny the paramilitaries the right to stand for office. Mr Uribe is trying to change that. But many normally pro-government congressmen fear opening the door for drug-traffickers to enter politics, as they have often attempted.

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Many of the AUC's tactics mirror those of their foes, the FARC. The left-wing guerrillas expanded during failed peace talks under Mr Uribe's predecessor. Those talks collapsed because the guerrillas never declared a ceasefire or agreed to demobilise. The AUC has been smarter. Although it has frequently violated its ceasefire, Mr Uribe has turned a blind eye, while unleashing the army against the FARC.

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Colombia faces a difficult choice. In the past, the politicians would have settled for peace, allowing the gunmen into politics even if that meant pardoning horrific crimes. Now, many Colombians--and international human-rights groups--resist that. Already, the paramilitary chieftains are gaining political power without, in practice, renouncing violence. An election next year could see their influence in Congress grow further.

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What is the alternative? Despite increased defence spending and American military aid, Colombia's security forces remain thinly stretched. After a quiet period, the FARC has returned to the offensive this year. The army took more than a week to relieve a recent guerrilla siege of Toribio, a small town in Cauca. If Colombians want to impose the rule of law across their country's vast territory, they will have to pay more taxes to strengthen the security forces and other state institutions. Otherwise, democratic politicians will be outspent and outgunned by drug traffickers, paramilitaries and guerrillas.

SOURCE: EIU/ INFO-e

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